BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE AN EXAGGERATED THREAT
THE ABILITY OF BIOWEAPONS TO DO DAMAGE IS EXAGGERATED
Avigdor Haselkorn, 1999. The continuing storm: Iraq, poisonous weapons and deterrence // hxm
In contrast, it has been argued that much of the thinking about BW is based on a myth. The legendary potency of biological weapons, some theorists maintain, is overestimated because of the literal interpretation of toxicities. "The minute amounts of toxin, viral and bacteriological materials required to kill or incapacitate has produced an almost universal belief that they constitute the basis of some of the most efficient weapons science has developed. 1114 In fact, numerous governmental studies in tile United States and elsewhere have concluded that biological weapons ire "an ]in-_ practical instrument of warfare."" Even UNSCOM seems to have been divided in its assessment of the potential impact of an Iraqi BW scenario.'
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS TO DEPLOY
Dr. William J. Perry, 1998, former US Secretary of Defense (1994-1997), Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink" US Counterproliferation Efforts: Prevent, Deter, Defend" JM
There is hope. While biological weapons are easy to construct they are difficult to employ. The onset of illness may take such long times that they offer little military utility. They arc so abhorrent that only the most deranged leaders would seek to employ these devices. Finally, from a practical standpoint they pose unusual dangers to the owner who would manufacture, store and employ biological weapons. Even Saddam Hussein is reported to have destroyed his anthrax spores and botulinum toxin before Desert Storm rather than risk the fallout from our expected bombing attacks.'
RUSSIAN BIOWEAPONS EXPERTS DO NOT WANT TO RELOCATE
JONATHAN TUCKER, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 2000;
REPAIRING THE REGIME, "Chemical and biological weapons" //
VT2002 acs p. 221
Some early assumptions about Russian brain drain have proved wrong. Although some scientists have left, the predicted mass exodus of weapons specialists has not materialized. One reason is that unless severely pressed, few Russians want to leave family and friends and move to an alien culture, even if they are paid handsomely for their services. For this reason, foreign governments are not only recruiting Russia's underpaid weapons experts to emigrate to those countries but are enlisting them in weapons projects within Russia's own borders. Weapons scientists living in Russia have been approached by foreign agents seeking information, technology, and designs, often under the cover of legitimate business practices to avoid attracting attention.