IMPACTS: NMD WILL MOVE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS TO DANGEROUS LAUNCH ON WARNING STATUS
EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILE DEFENSE WILL MOVE CHINA AND RUSSIA TO A LAUNCH ON WARNING POSTURE, INCREASING THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR
James Carroll, The Boston Globe, October 19, 1999, SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. A19, HEADLINE: America has become a danger to the world// ln-10-29-99-acs
But when we deploy a missile defense shield, Russia and China will inevitably worry that deterrence has been diluted. That will require Russia and China to respond with some kind of heightened offensive threat, since neither can soon deploy a matching defensive system. That heightening could take the form of increased levels of nuclear alert, like a policy of launch on first warning. Such adding hair to the hair trigger, in the argot, would increase the likelihood of an accidental launch. The new defenses could bring about the very catastrophe they are intended to deflect.
RUSSIAN LAUNCH ON WARNING INCREASES THE #1 RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR
Philipp Bleek, Federation of American Scientists;. Frank von Hippel professor of public and international affairsPrinceton University. The Washington Post, December 12, 1999, SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. B09 HEADLINE: Missile Defense: A Dangerous Move //acs-ln-12-22-99
Russia would keep as many nuclear warheads on hair-trigger, launch-on-warning alert as possible. This would increase the risk of an accidental or unauthorized Russian launch, arguably already the greatest threat to U.S. national survival.
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE WILL CAUSE RUSSIA TO INCREASE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND RETURN TO LAUNCH ON WARNING
Bruce G. Blair, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, "The Last 15 Minutes," May 1996 Briefing Book on Ballistic Missile Defense; The Front Lines of Defense: Controls and Alert Rates of Missileshttp://www.clw.org/ef/bmdbook/contents.html // ACS
Ballistic missile defense is only one of many possible ways of coping with the inherently risky practice of keeping strategic missiles on launch-ready alert. BMD is unique, however, for having a large potential to be counter-productive. Even though its purpose is to mitigate the consequences of an accidental or unauthorized Russian strike, BMD might increase the risk of such a strike occurring in the first place.
Russian planners cannot ignore the prospect that an American BMD system designed only to shield us territory from limited strikes could severely weaken Russian retaliatory capability if their forces were required to ride out an attack. If the United States proceeds to deploy BMD, they would doubtless assert that the Russian deterrent will then depend on retaining multiple warhead ICBMs, suspending the reduction of offensive arms, and/or further greasing their option of launch on warning. They might even resurrect a preemptive strategic option (as Russia has already intimated in its latest military doctrine). By reinforcing Russia reliance on rapid reaction by a large and dispersed arsenal of nuclear missiles, BMD would thus aggravate the very dangers it seeks to alleviate.