IMPACTS: NMD WILL DESTROY BENEFICIAL ANTI-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS
NMD WILL SERVE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR REAL POLICIES TO CONTROL WMD
ROBERT E. HUNTER, senior advisor at the Rand Corp., was, U.S. ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998, February 1, 2001, Los Angeles Times SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 11; Op Ed Desk HEADLINE: COMMENTARY; TIPTOEING INTO EUROPE'S BRIAR PATCH //VT2002acsln
These issues pale against the big struggle ahead over U.S. plans for a national missile defense system. Unfortunately, the Clinton administration did a poor job of explaining to the Europeans the purposes or the process of moving forward with NMD, and thus old fears about earlier U.S. ventures to protect itself with a missile shield have been resurrected. The allies also worry that U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would poison relations with Moscow, whether or not the treaty is obsolete, as Rumsfeld said recently.
And they worry that, in U.S. thinking, NMD will substitute for a broader strategy for dealing with weapons of mass destruction; that Europe either will be left outside the missile shield or will face the staggering costs of being included; that the U.S. will send the wrong signals to Beijing just as China is emerging on the world stage; and--as with the tiff over peacekeeping--that the new administration will look at security through a lens that does not focus on allied needs or concerns.
NMD WOULD INCREASE THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Jack Ruina March 04, 2001, The Washington Post SECTION: OUTLOOK; Pg. B03 HEADLINE: 46 Years, No Winners. Aim Elsewhere //VT2002acsln
And deploying NMD would have a paradoxical effect. It would generate political consequences that would run exactly counter to Bush's professed desire, which is to minimize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, reduce the nuclear stockpile worldwide and promote NATO cohesiveness. We would be trading the relatively limited threat of an attack from a smaller hostile nation for a much greater one: provoking the Russians and the Chinese.
I have been involved with the technology of missile defense for more than 40 years and am familiar with the complexities of developing such a system. I became director of the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency at the beginning of the Kennedy administration, when the agency was responsible for U.S. ballistic missile defense research programs. Later, I served as a member of President Nixon's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control at the time of the ABM Treaty negotiations and, in subsequent administrations, on various White House committees dealing with strategic nuclear weapons.
FUNDING TRADE OFFS MEAN NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE WILL CAUSE A DETERIORATION IN OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Jonathan Dean, Union of Concerned Scientists, 9-13-99 (DOWNLOAD) updated from "The Last 15 Minutes," May 1996 Briefing Book on Ballistic Missile Defensehttp://www.clw.org/ef/bmdbook/contents.html // ACS
The rogue state missile "bluff" scenario is far-fetched. Putting big money into national missile defense to meet it, while under funding the diplomatic, verification and control mechanisms of the non-proliferation regime which form our first line of defense and the conventional military forces which were used to cut off Iraq's programs to produce weapons of mass destruction is like spending most of your insurance money against meteors while shortchanging fire and termite protection. You may well regret it.
CHINA AND RUSSIA WILL REACT TO NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE BY SELLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER STATES
RICHARD N. HAASS, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, and Chair in International Security at the Brookings Institution, Foreign Affairs, September, 1999 / October, 1999; Pg. 37 HEADLINE: What to Do With American Primacy // ln-10/99-acs
Both China and Russia will feel threatened by American deployment of defensive systems. In response, they may sell technology that could bolster another state's unconventional weapons program.
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SIGNALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT WE HAVE GIVEN UP ON STOPPING NUCLEAR PROLIFERTATION
Steven Mufson, Washington Post Staff Writer, The Washington Post September 5, 1999SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A06 HEADLINE: Korean Missiles Push U.S. Defense Plans; Some Fear Buildup Could Hurt Stability // lnu-acs
Yet people active in international nonproliferation efforts believe that U.S. missile defense efforts show that the United States is giving up on nonproliferation and is resigned to countries such as Iran and North Korea obtaining nuclear weapons.
"As missile defense gathers speed, what is the political impact?" asks Roelf Ekeus, Sweden's ambassador to the United States and former head of the United Nations Special Commission for arms inspections in Iraq. "It gives the impression that the U.S. is settling down to live with nuclear weapons. The risk is that more and more [countries] just give up the hope [of nonproliferation], which I think is a great threat."
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE UNDERMINES MORE EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL METHODS
Nisha Baliga,Scoville Fellow, Natka Bianchini and Robert W. Tiller. Issue Brief: Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) January 1999
For more information, contact Robert W. Tiller at PSR, phone (202) 898-0150, ext. 220, e-mail:email@example.com // ACS
Pursuing ballistic missile defense is detrimental to U.S. global interests, because it encourages other countries to follow suit. While working closely with Russia on nuclear arms reduction, the U.S. is also spending billions of dollars to produce missile defenses, a strategy that undermines the arms reduction efforts.
WE NEED TO USE ALL POSSIBLE TOOLS TO FIGHT PROLIFERATION, NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE MAKES US NEGLECT THEM
Council for a Livable World 9-13-99 (DOWNLOAD) "The Last 15 Minutes," May 1996 updated Briefing Book on Ballistic Missile Defense; Bans on Weapons of Mass Destructionhttp://www.clw.org/ef/bmdbook/contents.html // ACS
The Prudence calls for the application of multiple tools to combat the threat of weapons of mass destruction. To the extent that international laws and export control cooperatives succeed in curbing proliferation and reducing weapons of mass destruction, US armed forces or defenses of last resort will be less likely to confront ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. The front-line defenses described above merit full US financial support for the international implementation of these treaties, as well as the full weight of US political and moral authority.