SOLVENCY: REPLACEMENT WITH THE DISARMAMENT IMAGE IS THE ANSWER
IT WOULD BE FAR BETTER TO FRAME THESE ISSUES FROM A "DISARMAMENT" AS OPPOSED TO A "PROLIFERATION" PERSPECTIVE
DAVID MUTIMER. Prof. Political Science York University. 2000; THE WEAPONS STATE PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VT2002 acs p.8-9
There are alternatives to the world of "proliferation" control. The creation of a "proliferation" image has drawn selectively on a rich set of discursive resources to form the world the practices it enables are in the process of effecting. Those same resources are available to opponents of the "proliferation" image to contest its practices. The nonaligned movement in general, and India in particular, have sporadically attempted to engage in such a contest, notably in terms of an image of "disarmament." In Chapter 6 1 explore this contest, looking not only at what opponents of a proliferation agenda have done but at how the terms in which they have tried to conduct the contest could be extended for a more successful contestation of "proliferation." In this chapter I begin to sketch one possible alternative representation of the relationship among weaponry, technology, and security-beginning with the preferred language of disarmament employed by those outside the privileged suppliers of the "proliferation" image and suggesting the resources available to articulate a successful alternative image. Such an image, drawing on features of the preproliferation discourses of military technology I discuss in Chapter 3, as well as contemporary discourses of technology and economy, would effect a rather different world from that of "proliferation."
Before I can talk of a world different from that created by the practices of proliferation control and of why it might be sought, however, I must explore the nature of the world those practices are effecting. To begin, I set out the terms in which that exploration will be conducted.
DISARMAMENT IMAGE WOULD STRENGTHEN THE NPT AND CTBT
DAVID MUTIMER, Prof. Political Science York University, 2000; THE WEAPONS STATE: PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VT2002 acs p. 105-106
Despite the difficulties associated with the language of "disarmament," it is a framing worth exploring more deeply because of the alternate practices it enables. By producing very different objects and identities, "disarmament" warrants similarly different practices-even though some of the instruments would be the same. As the nonaligned states' letter makes clear, framing the problem of military technology in terms of "disarmament" would not, for example, eliminate the need for the NPT. Rather, it would change the balance of obligations within the framework established by that treaty, placing much more emphasis on the requirements of Article V1. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides another example of the difference such an altered framing would produce. The CWC can reasonably be described as a disarmament treaty. It calls on the states party to dismantle any chemical arsenals they may possess in addition to adopting the more obviously "proliferation" control measures, thus establishing controls on the future production of chemical arms. A "disarmament" framing of the problem of chemical weapons could have produced the CWC, just as the "proliferation" framing did-indeed, the CWC had been negotiated for years within a disarmament practice, albeit without success.
FAR BETTER TO USE A DISARMAMENT IMAGE THAN A PROLIFERATION IMAGE
DAVID MUTIMER, Prof. Political Science York University, 2000- THE WEAPONS STATE: PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VT2002 acs p. 103
The argument that we should see problems of military technology through a "disarmament" frame rather than through the "Proliferation" frame is potentially very creative. Such a framing of the problem would not necessarily deny the importance of tackling proliferation-the nonproliferation treaty initially emerged out of a "disarmament" practice, and the nonaligned states' submission to the NPT extension conference recognized the importance of proliferation control as part of a disarmament agenda.
THE DISARMAMENT IMAGE IS DEMONSTRATED THROUGH THE "TABOO" IMAGE. AND GETS TO THE HEART OF THE RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE "USE" OF WMD
DAVID MUTIMER, Prof. Political Science York University, 2000; THE WEAPONS STATE: PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VT2002 acs p. 43
The taboo frame constitutes rather a different object than the military and arms control frames within which nuclear weapons were generally constituted. In the former frame it is use of the weapons that is constructed as the problem, whereas in the latter it is various aspects of their existence and deployment. There are a number of ways to illustrate this difference. For instance, both the Hague Convention and the Geneva Protocols prohibit the use of CW, whereas all of the various treaties concerned with controlling nuclear weapons consider issues of possession. The three SALT agreements, including the ABM, restrict what nuclear weapons may be held. The NPT divides the world between those allowed to hold nuclear weapons and those not so allowed. Even the dramatic agreements of the late 1980s focus on possession: the intermediate -range nuclear forces (INF) treaty shapes the arsenals of nuclear powers by eliminating certain types of weapons, and the strategic arms reduction treaties (START) place SALT-style limits on these arsenals, but they are limits that involve the destruction of certain weapons rather than ceilings on the addition of new weapons. The framing of the problem posed by a particular weapon in terms of its use enables very different practices than does a frame producing possession as the problem. Both ways of framing military technology have a part to play in the later production of the "proliferation" image.
THE DISARMAMENT IMAGE ALLOWS US TO GET RID OF WEAPONS, NOT JUST FOCUS ON WHO HAS THEM
DAVID MUTIMER, Prof. Political Science York University, 2000; THE WEAPONS STATE: PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VF2002 acs p. 104
The first, most obvious, and most important difference is that a "disarmament" framing of the problem of military technology would highlight weapons themselves. The "proliferation" image has constituted as its problem the technologies that give rise to a military capability-up to and including their weaponization. "Proliferation" highlights the technological precursors and downplays, in many instances, the actual weapons. A "disarmament" image would reverse this emphasis, focusing in the first instance on existing rather than potential arsenals. By highlighting the weapons and therefore downplaying the technological precursors, a "disarmament" image would open possibilities for a different relationship between broad technologies and weapons from that warranted by the technologically determinant "proliferation" image.
The difference between the problematic object being constituted in terms of weapons rather than of the technological precursors to those weapons is seen even more clearly when the identities constituted by each frame are considered. The "proliferation" image constitutes states in the first instance, as suppliers or recipients, reflecting their position in the technological flow of concern to proliferation controls. "Disarmament," by contrast, constitutes states in the first instance as armed and would differentiate among states by the degree of arming. Whereas the "proliferation" discourse places the onus on recipients not to translate that technology into weaponry, a "disarmament" image places the onus on armed states to reduce and ultimately eliminate the weaponry they possess.
DISARMAMENT IMAGE FOCUSES DIRECTLY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH IS A FAR MORE PRODUCTIVE WAY TO PURSUE SOLUTIONS TO THIS ISSUE
DAVID MUTIMER, Prof. Political Science York University, 2000; THE WEAPONS STATE- PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VT2002 acs p.117
The object of the "disarmament-development" image is in many ways the reverse of that constructed by "proliferation." Here weaponry is disconnected from its underlying technology, and it is the existence of the weapons themselves that is the problem rather than the movement of the technology on which they are based. That technology is then framed as instrumental to economic development, as well as potentially producing military capability. In this counterimage, the security focus is on the weapons, particularly their possession, and the emphasis is placed on the civilian side of the dual-use technology. If the discourse on conversion can be tied to this alternative image, the relationship between arms and their technological underpinnings can be reversed in a fruitful fashionarms can now produce civilian technology as well as the reverse. Such a shift, which makes use of discursive resources articulated by defenders of the "proliferation" image in other contexts, allows the development discourse to be framed in terms of competitiveness and markets-language central to the political discourse of the global economy.
DISARMAMENT ISSUE ALLOWS FRAMING OF ISSUE SO THAT TECHNOLOGY NEED NOT INEVITABLY LEAD TO WEAPONIZATION
DAVID MUTIMER, Prof. Political Science York University, 2000; THE WEAPONS STATE.- PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VT2002 acs p. 109-110
The importance of the attempted reframing of issues of "proliferation" in terms of "disarmament" is to allow for the dissociation of arms from their underlying technology. By constructing the problem as one of armament, "disarmament" enables technology to be imagined differently than in "proliferation's" notions of the inevitability of technological development giving rise to weaponization. The irony is that by constructing the problem in terms of the inevitability of the spread of technology and the weaponry derived from it, "proliferation" misses one of the key moments of weapons development on which effective controls could be placed. Weaponization is far from automatic. In the case of weapons of mass destruction, the most technically demanding part of the process is the creation of usable weapons from the underlying technologies of concernIraq may have enough VX nerve agent to kill millions, but this does not mean it has a reliable system of delivery. Similarly, it is not tremendously difficult for a state with reasonable access to resources to build a nuclear explosive, but it is much more difficult to build a militarily effective nuclear weapon. The practices of proliferation control, however, miss this crucial step entirely. Supplier groups and export controls target the movement of underlying technologies. IAEA safeguards monitor the movement of fissile material to ensure that none is diverted from power generation to explosives production. Even the chemical weapons convention targets the production of chemical agents rather than chemical weapons. A "disarmament" frame, by contrast, would construct the problem of military technology to highlight weapons and thereby enable practices directed at preventing weaponization of technologies. Such barriers could then allow a reframing of issues related to the movement of technology in terms of "development."
THE DISARMAMENT IMAGE WOULD ELIMINATE THE CONCEPT OF "ROGUE STATE"
DAVID MUTIMER, Prof. Political Science York University, 2000; THE WEAPONS STATE: PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VT2002 acs p. 104-105
On the other hand, the rogue state construction would be difficult to establish or maintain within a "disarmament" image. By downplaying potential arsenals relative to existing arsenals, the sorts of exaggerated claims about future threats that sustain the notion of rogues and weapon states would be almost impossible to make. Only in the context of an image that constructs the security problematic in terms of future arsenals, of weapons falling into the wrong hands, can rogues or weapon states be elevated to the level of a primary threat. If the security problematic focused on the threat posed by existing arsenals, any possible future arsenal, although still a concern, would be greatly discounted in the present.