CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE NOT EFFECTIVE FOR TERRORISTS
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE NOT EFFECTIVE TERRORIST TOOLS
Dr. Jean Pascal Zanders, Chemical and Biological Warfare Project at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Fall 1999 The Nonproliferation Review/ ASSESSING THE RISK OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION TO TERRORISTShttp://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/64/zander64.pdf //VT2002acsln
Based on these insights, the article concludes that while the acquisition of CB weapons by terrorists is defi-nitely feasible, such organizations nonetheless face enormous ob-stacles on the path to a CB weapon capability. This decreases the like-lihood of their proliferation to terrorists. Moreover, if terrorists acquire such a capability it is highly probable that the quality of the agents will be well below that of similar agents in military arsenals. Finally, from these insights the ar-ticle suggests ways to prepare for a terrorist strike that utilizes CB weapons.
EXPERIENCE SHOWS AND MANY CRITICS AGREE THAT BIOTERRORISM IS TOO DIFFICULT TO BE TAKEN THAT SERIOUSLY
MICHAEL OSTERHOLM, School of Public Health, Univ. of Minnesota, 2000; LIVING TERRORS: What America needs to know to survive the coming bioterrorist catastrophe //VT2002acs p. 102
The difficulties inherent in creating these weapons have led some observers into overconfidence and even a touch of cynicism. The doubters generally argue that making biological weapons is too difficult to constitute a credible threat. The failed attempts by Aum Shinrikyo to deploy its anthrax weapons, they say, shows that biological terrorism is out of reach for all but the most advanced, best-funded groups. Columnist Daniel S. Greenberg even wrote in a 1999 Washington Post article that "there's a whiff of hysteriafanning and budget opportunism in the scary scenarios of the saviors."