STATUS QUO WITH SANCTIONS IS THE BEST WAY TO ADDRESS THE IRAN WMD SITUATION
SANCTIONS SOLVE IRANIAN WMD
Eisenstadt, Autumn 99 Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Living with a Nuclear Iran?" Survival, The IISS Quarterly, Autumn, 1999//Sj*8
THUS, while the US has not succeeded in influencing Tehran to change its policies, it has succeeded often with the help of others - in denying it the means to carry them out. By helping to deprive Iran of the resources it could have otherwise used for a military build-up, American sanctions have contributed to the security of the US and its allies - however much the latter might dislike sanctions. Because Russia and North Korea continue to sell Iran arms and technologies needed to produce missiles and WMD for largely financial reasons, measures such as sanctions that hinder Tehran's ability to raise the hard currency needed for these purchases should remain a key element of US policy towards Iran. Moreover, sanctions should remain in place until Iran halts its efforts to acquire WMD, its involvement in terrorism and its support for violent opponents of the Arab-Israeli peace process either unilaterally or as part of a deal with the US.
SANCTIONS SOLVE IRANIAN WMD
Eisenstadt, Autumn 99 Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Living with a Nuclear Iran ?"Survival urvi The IISS Quarterly, Autumn, 1999//Sj*8
The US has had a fair degree of success in defining the agenda relating to Iran in consultations with its allies, and in convincing many to take steps that served to advance US policy objectives. Due in large part to US prompting in the 1980d, America's European allies imposed tight restrictions on the transfer of many types of dual-use technology to Iran, while banning the transfer of arms and nuclear technology outright. The US has also achieved a degree of success in pressing its European allies and multilateral lending institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF not to extend new concessional loans or credits to Iran (although these efforts have been aided by Iran's economic problems). By contrast, US efforts to urge Russia, North Korea and China to adopt restrictions on arms and technology transfers to Iran have met with only partial success. In recent years, Russia has been Iran's main source of conventional arms, missile technology and civilian nuclear technology. China has been also an important source of conventional arms, missile technology and technology for Iran's CBW and civilian nuclear programmes. And North Korea has been an important source of missiles and missile-production technology. Russia has agreed, however, not to conclude any new arms deals, to halt all conventionalweapons transfers after September 1999, and to limit civilian nuclear cooperation with Iran (although cooperation in the missile field shows no signs of abating). China likewise has agreed not to transfer any more advanced anti-ship missiles and to halt the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to Iran after current contracts are fulfilled." It remains to be seen, however, whether the souring of US relations with Russia and China as a result of NATO's war in Yugoslavia will undermine these achievements. US policy towards Iran can claim one key, unambiguous achievement: success in halting and delaying Iran's efforts to expand and modernise its armed forces and enhance its WMD capabilities through strategies of arms and technology denial, and economic sanctions."
STATUS QUO IRAN POLICY AWESOME ON PROLIFERATION
Eisenstadt, Autumn 99 Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Living with a Nuclear Iran?" Survival , The IISS Quarterly, Autumn, 1999 // Sj*8
Even if the US and its allies are unable to halt Iran's development of longrange missiles and nuclear weapons, efforts to delay these programmes are important.
First, when Iran and the US hold official talks some day, it might be easier for Tehran to trade away capabilities under development than to abandon capabilities that already exist, in return for the easing or lifting of sanctions by Washington. Iran has been able to create only 350,000 jobs Annually for the 800,000 young men (not to mention the women) joining the labour force each year. It will need tens of billions of dollars in foreign investment in the coming years to create jobs for these people and thereby avoid economic turmoil, and possibly political unrest. Iran badly needs the investment capital that US sanctions and pressure on third parties impedesWashington's ability to help Iran mitigate its financial problems by easing or lifting sanctions provides it with a great deal of leverage over Tehran, and could set the stage for a 'Grand Bargain' wherein Tehran abandons its nuclear programme in return for sanctions-relief and assistance in developing nonnuclear power sources.
Second, it buys time for the US and its allies to develop counter-measures to Iranian capabilities. For instance, in 1993-94, US-orchestrated multilateral pressure on North Korea discouraged Pyongyang from transferring the Nodong-1 missile to Iran, forcing Tehran instead to take the more roundabout route of building the Sheliab-3 missile (which is based on the Nodong-1) using production technology supplied by North Korea. That five-year delay provided the time for Israel to develop its US-funded Arrow anti-missile system. The Arrow system is expected to be partially operational by the end of 1999, at about the same time that the Shehab-3 is expected to enter operational service. Further delays in the Iranian programme might likewise provide the US and its allies with additional time to improve their theatre-missile-defence capabilities and for the US to develop a national-missiledefence system.
Finally, it is a hedge against the possibility of a more aggressive foreign and defence policy should hardline conservative clerics gain control over all the major centres of power in Tehran in the future. In such a situation, the hardliners will have fewer means at their disposal with which to pursue their objectives. Conversely, should the trend towards pragmatism and moderation in Iranian politics continue, American efforts could succeed in postponing Iran's development of longer-range missiles and nuclear weapons until the time that more moderate political elements are more firmly ensconced in Tehran. in this case, it is possible that they may decide, for a variety of reasons, to abandon Iran's longrange missile and nuclear-weapons programmes. But if they continue these programmes, it is better that the country be in the hands of relatively moderate reformers among Iran's clerical leadership than in the grips of conservative hardliners. Although both groups are committed to pursuing nationalistic policies in the Persian Gulf, and rigid ideological policies towards the ArabIsraeli conflict, the reformers may be less inclined to adventurism and less likely to rely on terrorism and subversion to achieve their goals. In this way the potentially destabilising impact of a nuclear Iran might be mitigated.