Critique of Language Arguments A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language "Arguments" Matthew Roskoski & Joe Peabody Debut Florida State University 3218 Tanager Ct. Apt. D. Tallahassee FL 32308 (904) 422-1284 A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language "Arguments" Abstract It has become fashionable lately for CEDA debaters to present language "arguments" in CEDA debate rounds. The essential defining element of a language "argument" is that it critiques not the actual arguments of the debater but rather the language or rhetoric the debater offers. It will be our position that such "arguments" are inadequate for several reasons. These reasons cluster around our analysis of the syllogism that comprises language "arguments." The major premise of language "arguments" is that language creates reality, the minor premise is that certain language is undesirable, and the conclusion is that the debater using the unacceptable language ought to be sanctioned with a ballot. We will deny the first premise and offer three reasons why the conclusion is incorrect. A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language "Arguments" It has become fashionable lately for CEDA debaters to present language "arguments" in CEDA debate rounds. The essential defining element of a language "argument" is that it critiques not the actual arguments of the debater but rather the language or rhetoric the debater offers. It will be our position that such "arguments" are inadequate for several reasons. These reasons cluster around our analysis of the syllogism that comprises language "arguments." The major premise of language "arguments" is that language creates reality, the minor premise is that certain language is undesirable, and the conclusion is that the debater using the unacceptable language ought to be sanctioned with a ballot. We will deny the first premise and offer three reasons why the conclusion is incorrect. Language Does Not Create Reality Language "arguments" assume the veracity of the Sapir- Whorf hypothesis. Usually, this is made explicit in a subpoint labeled something like "language creates reality." Often, this is implicitly argued as part of claims such as "they're responsible for their rhetoric" or "ought always to avoid X language." Additionally, even if a given language "argument" does not articulate this as a premise, the authors who write the evidence comprising the position will usually if not always assume the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Perhaps the most common example is the popular sexist language "argument" critiquing masculine generic references. Frequently debaters making this "argument" specifically state that language creates reality. The fact that their authors assume this is documented by Khosroshahi: The claim that masculine generic words help to perpetuate an androcentric world view assumes more or less explicitly the validity of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis according to which the structure of the language we speak affects the way we think. (Khosroshahi 506). We believe this example to be very typical of language "arguments." If the advocate of a language "argument" does not defend the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, then there can be no link between the debater's rhetoric and the impacts claimed. This being the case, we will claim that a refutation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is a sufficient condition for the refutation of language "arguments". Certainly no logician would contest the claim that if the major premise of a syllogism is denied, then the syllogism is false. Before we begin to discuss the validity of the hypothesis, we ought first to note that there are two varieties of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The strong version claims that language actually creates reality, while the weak version merely claims that language influences reality in some way (Grace). As Bloom has conceded, the strong version - "the claim that language or languages we learn determine the ways we think" is "clearly untenable" (Bloom 275). Further, the weak form of the hypothesis will likely fail the direct causal nexus test required to censor speech. The courts require a "close causal nexus between speech and harm before penalizing speech" (Smolla 205) and we believe debate critics should do the same. We dismiss the weak form of the hypothesis as inadequate to justify language "arguments" and will focus on the strong form. Initially, it is important to note that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis does not intrinsically deserve presumption, although many authors assume its validity without empirical support. The reason it does not deserve presumption is that "on a priori grounds one can contest it by asking how, if we are unable to organize our thinking beyond the limits set by our native language, we could ever become aware of those limits" (Robins 101). Au explains that "because it has received so little convincing support, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has stimulated little research" (Au 1984 156). However, many critical scholars take the hypothesis for granted because it is a necessary but uninteresting precondition for the claims they really want to defend. Khosroshahi explains: However, the empirical tests of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity have yielded more equivocal results. But independently of its empirical status, Whorf's view is quite widely held. In fact, many social movements have attempted reforms of language and have thus taken Whorf's thesis for granted. (Khosroshahi 505). One reason for the hypothesis being taken for granted is that on first glance it seems intuitively valid to some. However, after research is conducted it becomes clear that this intuition is no longer true. Rosch notes that the hypothesis "not only does not appear to be empirically true in any major respect, but it no longer even seems profoundly and ineffably true" (Rosch 276). The implication for language "arguments" is clear: a debater must do more than simply read cards from feminist or critical scholars that say language creates reality. Instead, the debater must support this claim with empirical studies or other forms of scientifically valid research. Mere intuition is not enough, and it is our belief that valid empirical studies do not support the hypothesis. After assessing the studies up to and including 1989, Takano claimed that the hypothesis "has no empirical support" (Takano 142). Further, Miller & McNeill claim that "nearly all" of the studies performed on the Whorfian hypothesis "are best regarded as efforts to substantiate the weak version of the hypothesis" (Miller & McNeill 734). We additionally will offer four reasons the hypothesis is not valid. The first reason is that it is impossible to generate empirical validation for the hypothesis. Because the hypothesis is so metaphysical and because it relies so heavily on intuition it is difficult if not impossible to operationalize. Rosch asserts that "profound and ineffable truths are not, in that form, subject to scientific investigation" (Rosch 259). We concur for two reasons. The first is that the hypothesis is phrased as a philosophical first principle and hence would not have an objective referent. The second is there would be intrinsic problems in any such test. The independent variable would be the language used by the subject. The dependent variable would be the subject's subjective reality. The problem is that the dependent variable can only be measured through self- reporting, which - naturally - entails the use of language. Hence, it is impossible to separate the dependent and independent variables. In other words, we have no way of knowing if the effects on "reality" are actual or merely artifacts of the language being used as a measuring tool. The second reason that the hypothesis is flawed is that there are problems with the causal relationship it describes. Simply put, it is just as plausible (in fact infinitely more so) that reality shapes language. Again we echo the words of Dr. Rosch, who says: {C}ovariation does not determine the direction of causality. On the simplest level, cultures are very likely to have names for physical objects which exist in their culture and not to have names for objects outside of their experience. Where television sets exists, there are words to refer to them. However, it would be difficult to argue that the objects are caused by the words. The same reasoning probably holds in the case of institutions and other, more abstract, entities and their names. (Rosch 264). The color studies reported by Cole & Means tend to support this claim (Cole & Means 75). Even in the best case scenario for the Whorfians, one could only claim that there are causal operations working both ways - i.e. reality shapes language and language shapes reality. If that was found to be true, which at this point it still has not, the hypothesis would still be scientifically problematic because "we would have difficulty calculating the extent to which the language we use determines our thought" (Schultz 134). The third objection is that the hypothesis self- implodes. If language creates reality, then different cultures with different languages would have different realities. Were that the case, then meaningful cross- cultural communication would be difficult if not impossible. In Au's words: "it is never the case that something expressed in Zuni or Hopi or Latin cannot be expressed at all in English. Were it the case, Whorf could not have written his articles as he did entirely in English" (Au 156). The fourth and final objection is that the hypothesis cannot account for single words with multiple meanings. For example, as Takano notes, the word "bank" has multiple meanings (Takano 149). If language truly created reality then this would not be possible. Further, most if not all language "arguments" in debate are accompanied by the claim that intent is irrelevant because the actual rhetoric exists apart from the rhetor's intent. If this is so, then the Whorfian advocate cannot claim that the intent of the speaker distinguishes what reality the rhetoric creates. The prevalence of such multiple meanings in a debate context is demonstrated with every new topicality debate, where debaters spend entire rounds quibbling over multiple interpretations of a few words.1 Language "Arguments" Infringe the Freedom of Speech As Justice William Brennan observed in his dissenting opinion in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, "students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." (Brennan 580). Given that the Supreme Court has already affirmed the first amendment rights of primary and secondary schoolchildren, it seems logical to assume that even greater protection would be given to the (theoretically) more mature and responsible university student. It is for this reason that many label university speech codes as "anathema to a university," and assert that "speech codes have no place at all on the American campus." (Hyde & Fishman 1486).1 The proper interpretation of these first amendment rights is articulated by the now famous words of Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes, who declared: If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought - not free thought for those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought that we hate. (Holmes 654). Certainly this principle would prohibit the enforcement of any language "argument." If one despised the rhetoric of a given debater enough to vote against that debater, then as Holmes suggests, the principles of the Constitution require one to refrain from censorship. The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts articulated the essence of this argument so eloquently that their entire statement deserves repetition here: When language wounds, the natural and immediate impulse is to take steps to shut up those who utter the wounding words. When, as here, that impulse is likely to be felt by those who are normally the first amendment's staunchest defenders, free expression faces its greatest threat. At such times, it is important for those committed to principles of free expressions to remind each other of what they have always known regarding the long term costs of short term victories bought through compromising first amendment principles. (Strossen 487). Certainly debaters and debate coaches, whose entire activity is premised upon the freedom of expression, ought to be among the staunchest defenders of that freedom. When we are asked to censor the rhetoric of a debater, as the C.L.U. warns, we ought to think long and hard about the risks associated with playing fast and loose with free speech. As Brennan notes, the mandate "to inculcate moral and political values is not a general warrant to act as 'thought police' stifling discussion of all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the official position." (Brennan 577). Not only does the first amendment create a moral or deontological barrier to language "arguments", the principles it defends also create a pragmatic barrier. The free and sometimes irreverent discourse protected by the first amendment is essential to the health and future success of our society. History has borne out the belief that the freedom to challenge convictions is essential to our ability to adapt to change. As Hyde and Fishman observe, university scholars must be allowed to "think the unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable" because "major discoveries and advances in knowledge are often highly unsettling and distasteful to the existing order." This leads them to conclude that "we cannot afford" to impose "orthodoxies, censorship, and other artificial barriers to creative thought" (Hyde & Fishman 1485). Given the rapid pace of political and technological change that our society faces, and given that debates often focus around the cutting edge of such changes, the imposition of linguistic straitjackets upon the creative thought and critical thinking of debaters would seem to uniquely jeopardize these interests. This is not just exaggerated rhetoric, nor is it merely our old debate disadvantages in new clothes. Hyde & Fishman's claims have been repeatedly validated by historical events. Had Elie Wiesel debated in Germany, a "Zionist language" argument would not have been unlikely. As Bennett Katz has argued, The essentiality of freedom in the community of American Universities is almost self-evident... To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation... Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die. (Katz 156). Language "Arguments" Are a Slippery Slope Nadine Strossen, president of the ACLU, has argued that campus hate speech policies can set precedents which facilitate the further restriction of other types of speech (Strossen 521). We contend that the same is true of language "arguments" in debate rounds. As Norton notes, "it is technically impossible to write an anti-speech code that cannot be twisted against speech nobody means to bar" (Strossen 486). The same is true of language "arguments." For example, a negative debater could choose to research the writings of right-wing extremists. Such a research endeavor would yield evidence that could be used for a language "argument" which we believe to be facially repugnant. John Patler, leader of the American National Party, makes statements such as "When the niggers speak of 'rights' they speak of the right to push themselves on the white people. When they speak of 'freedom' they really mean 'freedom' to take our women..." (Patler 3).1 A debater armed with enough such evidence could advance the argument that by using language that suggests that minorities have rights and freedom, the opponent is enabling the corruption of the white race and should ergo lose. We believe this has three ramifications. The first ramification is that the advocate of language "arguments" is faced with a dilemma. Assume that the debater making the above argument has sufficient skill and evidence to win the argument on the flow. In such a situation, one must decide whether or not to vote for the repugnant position. If one does, then language "arguments" forfeit their claim to moral legitimacy. One who will vote to censor pro-African American speech has no ground to claim an intent to improve the ethical persona of the debate activity. If one does not, then language "arguments" are revealed to be simply vehicles for the moral agendas of the advocates or critics in question. We would contend, in that circumstance, that a ballot is not the correct method of promoting one's personal moral agenda. Principles of non-intervention and impartiality would tend to support this assertion, as would Brennan's observation that educators are not in the business of mind-control. The second ramification is that language "arguments" could become a genuine slippery slope. The current fashion on the debate circuit is to oppose sexism and homophobia. If the AIDS crisis becomes worse, or if current feminism becomes more radicalized and begins to generate a backlash, then the prevailing attitude of the community could well reverse. If we legitimize language "arguments" as special voting issues now, with the intent of deterring rhetoric we find objectionable, then we risk a generation of language "arguments" that offend the very principles we intended to protect. If language "arguments" deserve any special status as voting issues, then we must presume that casting a ballot on a language "argument" is somewhat effective in deterring the allegedly repugnant rhetoric. If that is so, it is easy to imagine a circuit where repeated use of language "arguments" has successfully deterred all pro-homosexual rhetoric. One could defend language "arguments" by observing that the slippery slope claim applies equally well to substantive issues. We would suggest that there is an important distinction. Substantive issues are considered and weighed within the hypothetical realm of the debate round. Language "arguments" rely for their force upon the notion that they transcend that hypothetical realm. If language "arguments" operated within the hypothetical realm, then the critic would weigh the amount of patriarchy or whatever the impact-du-jour is against the case impact. Such an evaluation would almost always result in rejecting the language "argument" since the rhetoric of the debaters usually affects from 5 to 7 people while the case usually affects much more. Most advocates of language "arguments" instead claim that the debaters are personally responsible for their rhetoric in some way that is distinct from the substantive arguments in the debate. Our claim is that by transcending the hypothetical realm, language "arguments" develop a potential to chill speech above and beyond that of substantives. It is one thing to lose a debate because the case oppresses women in some manner, it is another to lose a debate because the debater is accused of oppressing women. The latter carries more social stigma and also would tend to be perceived more personally by debaters. Language "Arguments" Are Counterproductive There are several levels upon which language "arguments" are actually counterproductive. We will discuss the quiescence effect, deacademization, and publicization. The quiescence effect is explained by Strossen when she writes "the censorship approach is diversionary. It makes it easier for communities to avoid coming to grips with less convenient and more expensive, but ultimately more meaningful approaches" (Strossen 561). Essentially, the argument is that allowing the restriction of language we find offensive substitutes for taking actions to check the real problems that generated the language. Previously, we have argued that the language advocates have erroneously reversed the causal relationship between language and reality. We have defended the thesis that reality shapes language, rather than the obverse. Now we will also contend that to attempt to solve a problem by editing the language which is symptomatic of that problem will generally trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem. There are several reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that we may often be fooled into thinking that language "arguments" have generated real change. As Graddol and Swan observe, "when compared with larger social and ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern," further noting "there is also the danger that effective change at this level is mistaken for real social change" (Graddol & Swan 195). The second reason is that the language we find objectionable can serve as a signal or an indicator of the corresponding objectionable reality. The third reason is that restricting language only limits the overt expressions of any objectionable reality, while leaving subtle and hence more dangerous expressions unregulated. Once we drive the objectionable idea underground it will be more difficult to identify, more difficult to root out, more difficult to counteract, and more likely to have its undesirable effect. The fourth reason is that objectionable speech can create a "backlash" effect that raises the consciousness of people exposed to the speech. Strossen observes that "ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtably have had the beneficial result of raising social consciousness about the underlying societal problem..." (560). The second major reason why language "arguments" are counterproductive is that they contribute to deacademization. In the context of critiquing the Hazelwood decision, Hopkins explains the phenomenon: To escape censorship, therefore, student journalists may eschew school sponsorship in favor of producing their own product. In such a case, the result would almost certainly be lower quality of high school journalism... The purpose of high school journalism, however, is more than learning newsgathering, writing, and editing skills. It is also to learn the role of the press in society; it is to teach responsibility as well as freedom. (Hopkins 536). Hyde & Fishman further explain that to protect students from offensive views, is to deprive them of the experiences through which they "attain intellectual and moral maturity and become self-reliant" (Hyde & Fishman 1485). The application of these notions to the debate round is clear and relevant. If language "arguments" become a dominant trend, debaters will not change their attitudes. Rather they will manifest their attitudes in non-debate contexts. Under these conditions, the debaters will not have the moderating effects of the critic or the other debaters. Simply put, sexism at home or at lunch is worse than sexism in a debate round because in the round there is a critic to provide negative though not punitive feedback. The publicization effects of censorship are well known. "Psychological studies reveal that whenever the government attempts to censor speech, the censored speech - for that very reason - becomes more appealing to many people" (Strossen 559). These studies would suggest that language which is critiqued by language "arguments" becomes more attractive simply because of the critique. Hence language "arguments" are counterproductive. Conclusion Rodney Smolla offered the following insightful assessment of the interaction between offensive language and language "arguments": The battle against {offensive speech} will be fought most effectively through persuasive and creative educational leadership rather than through punishment and coercion... The sense of a community of scholars, an island of reason and tolerance, is the pervasive ethos. But that ethos should be advanced with education, not coercion. It should be the dominant voice of the university within the marketplace of ideas; but it should not preempt that marketplace. (Smolla 224-225).1 We emphatically concur. It is our position that a debater who feels strongly enough about a given language "argument" ought to actualize that belief through interpersonal conversation rather than through a plea for censorship and coercion. Each debater in a given round has three minutes of cross-examination time during which he or she may engage the other team in a dialogue about the ramifications of the language the opposition has just used. Additionally even given the efficacy of Rich Edwards' efficient tabulation program, there will inevitably be long periods between rounds during which further dialogue can take place. It is our position that interpersonal transactions will be more effective methods of raising consciousness about the negative ramifications of language. These interactions can achieve the goals intended by language "arguments" without the attendant infringements upon the freedom of speech. Works Cited Au, Terry Kit-Fong, "Chinese and English counterfactuals: The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis revisited," Cognition, 1983, 155-187. Bloom, Alfred H., "Caution - the words you use may affect what you say: A response to Au," Causation, 1984, 275-287. Brennan, William, "Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier" 108 S.Ct. 562 (1988). Cole, Michael & Barbara Means, Comparative Studies of How People Think, Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1981. Grace, George W., The Linguistic Construction of Reality, London: Croom Helm, 1987. Graddol, David & Joan Swann, Gender Voices, Cambridge: Oxford, 1989. Holmes, Oliver Wendall, "United States v. Schwimmer" 279 U.S. 644 (1929). Hopkins, W. Wat, "Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier : Sound Constitutional Law, Unsound Pedagogy," Northern Kentucky Law Review, 1989, 521-539. Hyde, Henry J. & George M. Fishman, "The Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991: A Response to the New Intolerance in the Academy." The Wayne Law Review, Spring, 1991, 1469-1524. Katz, Bennett R., "Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier : Has the Schoolhouse Gate Shut on the Marketplace of Ideas?" St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary, 1988, 141-157. Khosroshahi, Fatemeh, "Penguins don't care, but women do: A societal identity analysis of a Whorfian problem." Language and Society, 1989, 505-525. Miller, George A., "Psycholinguisics," in Gardner Lindzey & Ellio Aronson, The Handbook of Social Psychology - 2nd. ed., Reading: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1969. Patler, John. "John Patler Answers some important questions about the American National Party." Unpublished pamphlet. Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas. Works Cited Robins, Robert H., "The current relevance of the Sapir- Whorf hypothesis," in Rik Pinxten, Universalism versus Relativism in Language and Thought, The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1976. Rosch, Eleanor, "Linguistic Relativity," ETC: A Review of General Semantics, Fall, 1987, 254-279. Schultz, Muriel, in Deborah Cameron, The Feminist Critique of Language, London: Routledge, 1990. Strossen, Nadine, "Regulating Racist Speech on Campus; A Modest Proposal?" Duke Law Journal, 1990, 484-569. Takano, Yohtaro, "Methodological Problems in Cross- Cultural Studies of Linguistic Relativity," Cognition, 1989, 141-162. 1 Additionally, there would seem to be a fundamental tension between advocating a topicality argument which recognizes the possibility of multiple meanings and advocating a language "argument" premised upon the Sapir- Whorf hypothesis. 1 This invites the question of the applicability of first amendment principles to debate critics. We would note two thoughts. First, debate critics are usually state employees, and hence may be technically bound. Second, even if this is not so, the general principles articulated by the first amendment ought to be adhered to by private citizens in private contexts. If it is wrong for the state to censor the speech of a citizen, it is equally wrong for any authority figure to censor the speech of a subordinate. 1 Lest there be any misunderstanding, we do not advocate or support this position or the use of this rhetoric. We do, however, choose deliberately to quote this rhetoric to demonstrate the magnitude of the repugnance available to the potential advocate. 1 We have replaced the phrase "hate speech" in the original text with {offensive speech}. This was done to illustrate more vividly the applicability of Smolla's argument to our specific context. We believe that the sentiments expressed by the advocates of free speech in the context of debates over hate speech regulations are completely applicable in substance and in spirit to the question of the acceptability of language "arguments."